论激励性股票期权的理论基础  

On inspiratonal share options theory foundation

作　　者：李明辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南大学法学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《特区经济》2008年第10期125-126,共2页Special Zone Economy

摘　　要：在现代企业两权分离的情况下,资源配置和创造财富主要依靠经营者实现,企业的运营结果主要取决于经营者的素质和行为趋向,而经营者的素质和行为趋向则通常受企业内部机制影响,企业如果不能形成一套合理的内部机制,"委托—代理"矛盾将会深化,企业就会因此而付出较大的代价。正是为了解决"委托—代理"的矛盾,西方国家较早地发明了一种有效地激励约束办法—激励性股票期权制度。笔者拟就激励性股票期权的理论基础略书管见,求教于法学界同仁。In the circumstances of separation of the two rights of modern enterprise, the allocation of re-sources and the creation of wealth mainly rely on the operators to achieve, the enterprise＇s operating re-sults depends largely on the quality and acting tend of operators, and the quality and acting tend of operators is usually subject to their internal mechanisms Impact on business. If they can not form a complete set of rea-sonable internal mechanisms, ＂commission -agent＂ con-tradictions will have been deepen, enterprises will have been costly for so. In order to solve the ＂commis-sion -agent＂ of the conflict, the Western countries invented an effective incenting and restrainting meth-ods -incentive stock options system earlier. I intend to discuss the theoretical basis of incentive stock op-tions and study from colleagues in legal circles.

关 键 词：股票期权 激励性股票期权 理论基础 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]