国家助学贷款中的逆向选择与道德风险  

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in National Student Loan

作　　者：杨得前[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学应用经济学博士后流动站,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《黑龙江高教研究》2008年第11期24-26,共3页Heilongjiang Researches on Higher Education

基　　金：江西省教育科学规划项目(编号:07YB187)

摘　　要：首先指出在国家助学贷款运行中存在"混同均衡"、"逆向选择"及"道德风险"诸多问题。然后从信息经济学的角度分析了这些问题产生的根源,结果显示,相关部门与国家助学贷款申请者之间的信息不对称是造成"逆向选择"的主要原因,而风险补偿专项基金制度设计上的缺陷进一步加剧了"逆向选择"。而由于现行国家助学贷款的高风险、高成本、低流动性导致了"道德风险"的出现。最后提出了根治这些问题的对策。＂ Pooling equilibrium＂, ＂adverse selection＂ and ＂moral hazard＂ have largely existed during the application of national student loan. The paper analyses the causes of the forgoing problems based on information economics. Information asymmetry between authorities and applicants is the primary cause of ＂adverse selection＂, and the imperfections in special - purpose funds for risks compensating aggravate ＂adverse selection＂. High risks, high costs and low liquidity of national student loan leads to ＂moral hazard＂. Lastly, the paper puts forward countermeasures for these problems.

关 键 词：国家助学贷款 混同均衡 逆向选择 道德风险 

分 类 号：G40-055[文化科学—教育学原理]