科举制度的延续:一个经济学视角  

The Continuance of The Imperial Examination System——An Economics Perspective

作　　者：许引旺[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院,博士研究生福建厦门361005

出　　处：《北方论丛》2008年第6期104-107,共4页The Northern Forum

摘　　要：从制度经济学的视角分析,科举制度在中国历史上之所以长期延续,是科举制度绩效优势,制度均衡、制度变迁和路径依赖的交叉互动,以及科举隐性合约等多种因素综合作用的结果。与察举制、九品中正制和分封世袭制相比,科举制度具备绩效优势。而制度供给对持续的制度需求的响应、以制度养护为主要内容的制度变迁以及在此过程中所形成的路径依赖,使科举制度成为各个封建王朝所依赖的选仕制度。科举制度可以被理解为普通民众和统治者之间的隐性合约,而自我履约性确保了合约关系的延续。In the view of Institutional Economies, the reasons why the Imperial Examination System had lasted a long term in Chinese history are the systematic performance advantage, the reciprocity of systematic equilibrium, systematic changes and path dependence, and the implicit contract of Imperial Examination. Compared with the Election system, the Jiupinzhongzheng system and the Hereditary System, the Imperial Examination System has performance advantage. The supply of system continually satisfied the demand of system and the system changes with the main content of nourishing system, together with the path dependence shaped meanwhile, caused the Imperial Examination System become the examination system for most feudalistic dynasty. The hnperial Examination System can be considered as an implicit contract between civilian and dominator, and self- enforcing agreement insure the continuance of contract relation.

关 键 词：科举制度 制度绩效 制度均衡 隐性合约 

分 类 号：F0[经济管理—政治经济学] D691.3[政治法律—政治学]