作业预算对企业内部契约的改进研究  

A Study of Activity-based-budget’s Effect on the Inside Contract Improvement of Enterprise

作　　者：李志刚[1] 徐莉萍[2] 

机构地区：[1]长沙学院财务处,湖南长沙410003 [2]湖南大学会计学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《财会通讯（学术版）》2008年第11期95-98,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：湖南省软科学研究计划"湖南省新型工业化进程中生态预算控制研究"(项目编号:2007zk3018)

摘　　要：在委托代理理论下,预算管理是实现企业外部契约的内部契约保障机制,可以较好地协调各级委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突。但传统的预算管理模式重点研究所有者对高层管理人员的激励与约束经济权衡,忽视了企业治理结构下权力的分层授权控制理论,造成了高层管理人员对中低层管理人员及操作人员控制与考核的理论与实务缺失。本文认为,采用作业预算可以填补传统预算管理存在的空白,对企业的内部契约进行有效改进,设计出可靠的业绩合同和业绩评价体系,能降低契约中的代理成本和博弈成本。The traditional budget management emphasizes the owners’spurring of the high level managers, and constraining the economic balance, but overlooks the control with power-entrust-on-the-level within the enterprise management. As a result, the higher managers may neglect or fail in control and check of the lower managers and other workers theoretically and practically. However, according to the principal-agent theory, budget management serves as a guarantee mechanism in turning outside contract into inside contract of an enterprise, which can better coordinate the interest conflicts between principals and agents on different levels.This paper, based on reviewing the studies published, maintains that activity-based-budget may fill in the blank in traditional budget management, so as to make an effective research of and improve the contract-inside-the-enterprise, based on which they can develop a reliable perfor- mance-contract and performance-evaluation system for the purpose to reduce the agent cost and game cost in the contract.

关 键 词：委托代理 内部契约 作业预算 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]