具有R&D溢出时的企业提成许可策略与政府R&D补贴激励  

Royalty Licensing Strategy and the Incentive for Government R&D Subsidy with R&D Spillovers

作　　者：钟德强[1] 赵丹[1] 罗定提[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学管理科学与工程研究所,湖南株洲412008

出　　处：《系统工程》2008年第9期111-115,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70540014)

摘　　要：建立一个带有R&D产出溢出的四阶段R&D竞赛模型,分析在单位提成许可策略下企业R&D溢出以及在许可得益上的讨价还价能力对政府的R&D政策的影响。证明在只有一个企业进行创新时,政府没有对本国企业进行补贴的动机。在两个企业都进行创新时,若R&D溢出小于二分之一,对于受许方而言,不管其讨价还价能力如何,其国政府都不会对其进行补贴。而对于许可方,其国政府则要根据其国企业在许可得益上的讨价还价能力进行激励,若本国企业讨价还价能力较大,政府将对其进行补贴,但如果本国企业讨价还价能力较小时,政府将对其进行征税;若R&D溢出等于二分之一,政府将根据其企业的讨价还价能力对其进行激励;若R&D溢出大于二分之一,政府将对本国企业的R&D进行补贴。This paper establishes a four-stage R＆D rivalry model with R＆D spillovers in outputs, and analyzes the effects of R＆D spillovers and bargaining power upon the licensing gain within firms on R＆D subsidy policy in royalty licensing. We show that when only a firm innovates, there is no incentive for the governments to subsidize its firms＇ R＆D, and when both firms innovates , if the R＆D spillover is smaller than one half, as far as the licensee is concerned, its government will not subsidizes it no matter what it＇s bargaining power upon the licensing gain is, but for the licensor, when it＇s bargaining power is greater than the other, the government will subsidize its domestic firm＇s R＆D, while it will impose a tax if the firm＇s bargaining power is less than the other. If the R＆D spillover equals one half, the government＇s R＆D policy will be decided by its firm＇s bargaining power; if the R＆D spillover is more than one half, both governments will subsidize R＆D investment by their domestic firms.

关 键 词：提成许可 R&D溢出 政府R&D补贴 讨价还价能力 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理] F713[经济管理—国民经济]