大股东资金占用与盈余管理:问题掩饰还是揭露  

Cash Tunneling by Large Stockholder and Earnings Management: Concealment or Revelation of Damage

作　　者：陈政[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,厦门361005

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2008年第12期51-58,共8页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：本文以2002～2004沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,结合我国上市公司股权集中的制度背景,考察大股东资金占用与盈余管理的关系。实证研究显示,大股东资金占用程度越高,上市公司越会通过向上盈余管理掩饰占用的不利后果。研究同时发现估计可操控应计时应该剔除资金占用产生的现金流影响,这样可以减少应计模型误判或无法识别盈余管理的可能。本文透过资金占用探究其背后所隐藏的大股东的利益转移动机及盈余管理倾向,这对全流通之后大小股东之间的委托代理问题研究依然具有参考意义。This article tests the relationship between tunneling by large stockholder and earnings management using data of A-share companies during 2002 to 2004. The results suggest that the more large shareholder＇ s tunneling, the more upward earnings management conceals these adverse consequences. We also find that it is necessary to eliminate the cash effect of tunneling when accrual model is used, which helps mitigating false inference. Our research makes sense given the principle-agent problem between large and minor stockholders even under the full-circulation era.

关 键 词：大股东掏空 公司治理 盈余管理 公司财务 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]