基于网络外部性的固定与比例抽成技术许可  

Fee versus royalty technology licensing with network externality

作　　者：潘小军[1] 陈宏民[1] 胥莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2008年第6期11-17,共7页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802037)

摘　　要：利用数量竞争模型,考虑技术在具有网络外部性特征的情况下,当企业拥有降低成本的技术创新时,对固定费用和抽成许可这两种技术许可的定价方式进行了研究和比较.发现,如果企业收取固定技术许可费用,则当在非剧烈创新下,只有当创新幅度较小时,创新企业才愿意进行许可技术,并且最终的许可费大小由两个参与企业通过讨价还价博弈确定.如果企业选择产量抽成技术许可,在非剧烈创新情况下,抽成比例的大小与产品有无网络外部性特征无关.在非剧烈创新条件下,对创新技术拥有企业而言,产量抽成许可方式好于固定费用许可方式.This paper studies and compares technology licensing by means of a fixed-fee and licensing by means of a royalty in a Cournot-duopoly market with network externality, where one of the firms has a cost-reducing innovation. It is found under the fixed-fee licensing method, that, only when the magnitude of the innovation is less than the non-drastic innovation, will the innovation firm license its innovation, and the value of license fee is depending on the two firms bargaining game. If licensing is granted by means of a royalty, the rate of royalty is not related to network externality under non-drastic innovation and is negatively related to network externality. The royalty licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing for the patent-holding firm with nondrastic innovation.

关 键 词：技术许可 网络外部性 固定费用许可 比例抽成许可 

分 类 号：F273.2[经济管理—企业管理]