电力环境监管中的合谋博弈分析与防范机制  

Game Analysis and Collusion-proof Mechanism in Electric Environment Supervision

作　　者：王恩创[1] 任玉珑[1] 杨菲菲[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《工业工程》2008年第6期10-14,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(90510016)

摘　　要：在电力环境监管过程中,由于利益的驱动及信息不对称,监管者和发电企业之间存在合谋行为。运用博弈论原理,通过对政府、监管者和发电企业三方博弈行为的分析,发现政府加大核查力度、降低核查成本和减少合谋收益是防范合谋的有效措施。基于三层代理分析框架,构建一个电力环境监管的"委托-监管-代理"模型来探讨合谋防范与激励机制,并提出了相应的政策建议。Driven by benefits, and due to asymmetrical information, collusion behaviors occur between supervisors and power generators in the process of electric environment supervision. By utilizing the game theory, the tripartite gambling behaviors of the government, the supervisor and the enterprise were analyzed, which found that an increase in government invertigation dynamics, and a reduction in the cost of invertigation and collusion income are efficacious devices to guard against collusions. Based on the three-hierarchy organization analysis ,a ＂request-supervision-proxy＂ model was constructed to inspect collusion-proof and incentive mehanism. Related proposals were put forward.

关 键 词：发电企业 环境监管 合谋防范 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]