后股权分置背景下上市公司控制权机制研究  

Research on Listed Companies' Control Mechanism in Post Equity Division Era

作　　者：马磊[1] 徐向艺[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2008年第6期36-40,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：通过对股权分置时代中国上市公司控制权机制存在的缺陷——控制权配置的错位和控制权市场的失效进行的分析可以发现,在股权分置格局下,大股东与小股东的利益机制截然割裂是导致"大股东控制"和"内部人控制"问题以及控制权市场外部治理机能失效的根源所在。同时,通过对股权分置改革对中国上市公司股权结构、控制权内部配置以及控制权外部转移正反两方面的影响的分析表明,后股权分置时代优化控制权机制应当引入"股东实质平等"原则,以增强中小股东的行权便利性,等等。It is the core assure the effectiveness of corporate governance to put up proper allocation and effective transference of corporate control, therefore on the basis of the evaluation on the existing research materials about control allocation and control transfer and through the analysis of the present limitation in control mechanism, that is, the fault of control collocation and the invalidation of control market, the paper points out that it is the division of benefits mechanism between large shareholder and small shareholder that leads to the problem of ＂large shareholder control＂ and of ＂inner managers＇ control＂. After then through the analysis of the influence of equity division reformation on equity structure, control allocation and control transfer positively and negatively, the paper finally brings forward the correlative suggestions to optimize the control mechanism in the post equity division era such as the introduction of the principle of ＂shareholders＇ equity virtually＂ and the buildup of the convenience of small shareho ders right.

关 键 词：后股权分置时代 控制权机制 公司治理机制 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]