公平偏好、薪酬管制与国企高管激励--一种基于行为合约理论的分析  

Fairness Preference,Compensation Regulation and Incentives of Senior Managers in State-owned Enterprises——Based on Behavior Contract Theory

作　　者：黄再胜[1,2] 王玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433 [2]南京政治学院上海分院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2009年第1期16-27,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：中国博士后基金项目资助(20080430647)

摘　　要：转型期,政府主管部门为何要对国企高管薪酬进行严格的管制?文章建立了一个包含政府主管部门公平偏好的薪酬激励模型,强调薪酬管制内生于政府对社会公平问题的关注和转型期国企高管身份的模糊性。出于对国企初次收入分配的公平偏好,政府主管部门对国企高管薪酬有进行管制的冲动或倾向;而转型期国企高管的身份模糊性,直接导致其保留收入的不确定性,进而为政府主管部门实施薪酬管制提供了现实条件。Why does the supervision authority make strict regulations on compensations of senior managers in state-owned enterprises during the transition period？ This paper builds a compensation-incentive model involving government fairness preference. It emphasizes that compensation regulation is endogenously caused by government concern on social fairness and the identities of senior managers in state-owned enterprises are ambiguous. As a result of fairness preference on primary income distribution in stateowned enterprises, there exists a tendency for the government to regulate the senior managers＇ compensations in state-owned enterprises. And the identity ambiguity of senior managers in state-owned enterprise directly leads to the uncertainty of their reservation income, which provides a real basis for the government to regulate the compensations of senior managers in statedowned enterprises.

关 键 词：薪酬管制 公平偏好 身份模糊 保留收入 

分 类 号：F046[经济管理—政治经济学]