塔斯基的真理定义与物理论  

Tarski's Definition of Truth and Physicalism

作　　者：王文方[1] 

机构地区：[1]台湾中正大学哲学系

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2008年第1期84-102,共19页Studies in Logic

基　　金：NSC-96-2420-H-194-008

摘　　要：塔斯基(Tarski)于1933年发表了他著名的真理定义,并相信该定义能够为其物理论的哲学立场服务;但费尔德(Field)批评说,塔斯基实际上所给出的真理定义并没能成功地达成这个目标。不过,费尔德同时也认为,一个部分奠基在塔斯基真理定义之上、并且是物理论者可以接受的化约性真理理论并非不可能。费尔德对于塔斯基真理定义的这些批评,在哲学家中曾经引起了许多意见不一的反应。本文的目的是想回答在这些讨论当中曾经被提出过的三个问题。首先,塔斯基实际上所给出的真理定义是不是一个物理论者可以接受的化约性定义?其次,费尔德所设想的那种可被物理论者所接受的化约性真理理论是否可能成功?最后,如果塔斯基实际上所给出的定义并不能符合物理论的化约目标,那么,一个物理论者是否便应该据此去反对塔斯基的真理定义?本文的最终结论是:这三个问题的正确答案都是否定的。A. Tarski published his famous definition on truth in 1933, believing that it could serve, beside many other things, his philosophical position of physicalism. H. Field criticizes that the definition of truth given by Tarski does not really succeed in achieving this goal. Field thinks, however, that a revised version partially based on Tarski＇s definition of truth could serve better for the reductive plan of physiealism. Field＇s comments on Tarski have given rise to several non-consensus responses by philosophers. The present paper is another attempt to answer three questions involved in these debates. First, is the definition of truth given by Tarski really not acceptable to reductive physicalism, as Field complains？ Second, could the theory speculated by Field who claims that it will serve better for reductive physicalism succeed in achieving this goal？ Third, if the answer to the first question is ＇ No＇ , should a physicalist thereby reject Tarski＇s definition of truth？ The conclusion of this paper is that the answers to these three questions are all ＇ No＇ s. More specifically, I will argue that （ 1 ） Soames＇s defense that Tarski＇s definition of truth could serve well for the reductive plan of physiealism fails for several reasons and Kirkham＇s claim that Tarski＇s definition of truth does not have any explanatory goal is not a historical truth ; （2） Field＇s speculated theory of truth also fails to achieve its goal because of not being able to overcome the so-called ＂qua-problem＂ ; and （3） though Tarski＇s definition of truth is not good for reductive physicalism, it is still welcomed by token＇physicalism, especially Davidson＇s anomalous monism.

关 键 词：塔斯基 费尔德 真理 物理论 

分 类 号：B812[哲学宗教—逻辑学]