私募股权投资基金薪酬合约的激励机制研究  

A Research on the Incentive Mechanism for Compensation Contract in Private Equity Funds

作　　者：项海容[1,2] 刘星[2] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学法政学院,上海200092 [2]复旦大学应用经济学博士后流动站,上海200433

出　　处：《经济经纬》2009年第1期146-149,共4页Economic Survey

摘　　要：利用合约经济学的分析方法研究私募股权投资基金的薪酬合约,我们发现:在不对称信息下创业投资家的道德风险会造成显著的代理成本。并且私募基金管理的代理成本与创业投资家的能力、风险厌恶程度以及私募股权投资基金投资组合的风险正相关;同时我们发现在私募股权投资基金的薪酬合约中引入创业板市场的景气状况作为投资组合收益的基准可显著提高创业投资家的努力激励,并显著降低私募股权投资基金管理的代理成本。Studying the compensation contract of private equity funds with the contract theory, the authors find that under asymmetric information the moral risks of investors will cause prominent agent cost. The agent cost of private equity funds is positively related to the ability of investors, the risk aversion and the risk of the portfolios of private equity funds ; the authors also find that in the compensation contract of private equity funds considering the innovation market prosperity condition as the benchmark of the income of portfolios can enhance obviously the effort of investors and decrease obviously the agent cost of the management of private equity funds.

关 键 词：私募股权投资基金 薪酬 代理成本 创业板市场 基准 

分 类 号：F244.3[经济管理—劳动经济]