闭环供应链的激励机制研究  

Study on Incentive Mechanism of Closed Loop Supply Chain

作　　者：孙宝凤[1] 杨华[2] 吴梦娜[2] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学交通学院,吉林长春130022 [2]吉林大学管理学院,吉林长春130022

出　　处：《公路交通科技》2009年第2期134-138,共5页Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development

基　　金：吉林省科技厅国际合作项目(20060705);吉林省专项基金项目(20072402)

摘　　要：运用信息经济学的委托代理理论研究了闭环供应链的激励机制问题,在单一制造商和单一零售商构成的闭环供应链中,按照任务是否易于观测,将零售商参与闭环供应链的活动定义为易于观测的正向物流活动和不易观测的逆向物流活动。通过建立闭环供应链的多任务委托-代理模型,经定性描述、定量推导与求解,确定了激励合同中最优激励强度系数的数量关系,并得到了一系列有意义的结论。最后通过算例进行了分析和说明,为设计和管理闭环供应链的激励机制提供理论依据。Using principal-agent theory of information economics, the incentive mechanism of Closed Loop Supply Chain （CLSC） formed by a single manufacturer and a single retailer was studied. According to the retailer＇s task observation degree, the retailer＇s activities were defined as forward logistics activity which can be observed easily and reverse logistics activity which cannot be observed easily. Then an incentive model was established based on multi-task principal-agent theory. After qualitative description, quantitative analysis and solution, the optimal incentive intensity coefficient was determined and a series of meaningful conclusions were obtained. Finally, a numerical example was given to analyze and illustrate the model. The conclusion provides a theoretical basis for the design and management of CLSC.

关 键 词：运输经济 闭环供应链 激励机制 多任务委托-代理 逆向物流 

分 类 号：F406.2[经济管理—产业经济]