城市环境治理投入中地方政府与中央政府的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Investment of Urban Environment Governance between Local and Central Government

作　　者：洪璐[1] 彭川宇[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]西南交通大学人文学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2009年第1期70-74,共5页Urban Development Studies

摘　　要：文章从中央政府与地方政府总收益函数分析出发,指出中央政府与地方政府在地方政府环境治理、财政支出比例选择上存在的差异;运用混合战略博弈模型对中央政府与地方政府博弈行为进行分析,得出地方政府执行环境政策的最优概率及中央政府对地方政府环境政策执行情况进行监督的最优概率;提出循环经济的推广使用及环境治理问责制的实施有利于提高城市环境治理投入,改善城市环境质量,实现社会经济的可持续发展。According to the totol return analysis of central and local government, this paper gives the difference on the investment to environment governance from local finance expenditure. By mixed strategy game theory, this paper elicits the optimal probability of environment policy enforcement of local government and environment policy supervision of central government. This paper suggests that the application of circular economy and enforcement of responsibility - asked policy could increase the investment of environment governance, improve the unban environment quality and implement the sustainable development of society and economy.

关 键 词：环境治理 财政支出 循环经济 问责制 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]