上市公司业绩预告制度实施效果研究——基于深市上市公司年报业绩预告的经验证据  

An Empirical Analysis on Earnings Preannouncement of China Listed Companies

作　　者：王惠芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2009年第1期108-112,共5页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：我国现行的上市公司业绩预告制度是部分强制披露,即达到披露要求的公司必须进行业绩预告,未达到要求的公司可以自愿披露。通过对我国上市公司业绩预告制度实施效果的研究,发现我国上市公司业绩预告制度整体实施效果良好,但也存在披露内容缺乏信息含量、公司自愿披露动力不足、不愿或迟延披露坏消息(预亏、预减)等问题。The existing earnings preannouncement system is partially compulsory, that is, companies up to the standard of preannouncement must preannounce their earnings while those are not up to the standard can do it voluntarily. By studying the actual effects of the preannouncement system, the author finds that the effect of the preannouncement, on the whole, is good, but there still exists the problems such as lack of sufficient information, inadequate motivation to disclose, reluctance or delay to disclose bad news, e.g. forecast loss or decrease.

关 键 词：上市公司 业绩预告制度 预亏 扭亏 预增 预减 实施效果 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]