终极产权与公司价值--对中国上市公司激励与壁垒效应的实证检验  

Ultimate Property and Corporate Value——An Experimental Testing on Incentive Effect and Entrenchment Effect of Chinese Listed Company

作　　者：刘孟晖[1] 沈中华[2] 余怒涛[1,3] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]台湾大学金融系,中国台北10617 [3]云南财经大学会计学院,云南昆明650221

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2009年第1期62-68,共7页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：在终极产权的框架下,通过对2005年中国上市公司样本的研究,文章检验了公司大股东的激励效应与壁垒效应。实证结果表明,大股东现金流权与控制权的适当集中,一方面具有提高公司价值的作用,另一方面,随着控制权超过现金流权,二者发生偏离,公司的价值下降。对国有公司而言,其现金流权与控制权的偏离对价值并没有显著影响,但对家族公司而言,现金流权与控制权的偏离却与价值显著负相关,二者的偏离程度越大,公司的价值就越低。Under the frame of property, the paper examines incentive effect and entrenchment effect of big shareholder by researching Chinese listed company sample in 2005. The experimental result indicate thats the appropriate concentration of big shareholder＇s cash flow right and control right, on the one hand, has effect on corporate value, on the other hand, with control right exceeding cash flow right, corporate value decline. As for nation-ownered corporation, the deviation on cash flow right and control right has no statistical effect on corporate value, but as for family-ownered corporate the deviation on cash flow right and control right has statistical negative effect on corporate value. More big the deviation degree, more low corporate value.

关 键 词：终极产权 激励效应 壁垒效应 公司价值 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]