内部货币与我国最优关税政策研究  

Inside Money and Optimal Tariff Policy of China

作　　者：张顺明[1] 余军[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2009年第2期18-31,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(07AJL002);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(07JJD790145)

摘　　要：本文将内部货币引入一个包含两国两商品的纯交换经济,在考虑贸易关税的情形下,将此拓展成一个Nash关税博弈模型。我们用2005年中国与世界其他国家(ROW)的产出和双边贸易数据对该贸易模型进行数值分析,考察一般经济均衡条件下内部货币的引入对我国与ROW最优关税政策的影响。研究表明:(1)内部货币对贸易双方关税博弈的Nash均衡有显著影响,即相对于无内部货币的情形,内部货币的存在将削弱我国在关税博弈中的关税报复力量。(2)中国在2005年的实际关税接近于不考虑ROW关税报复时的最优关税水平及Nash均衡关税,而ROW当时的实际关税却远低于其最优关税和Nash均衡关税水平,这说明我国在2005年所采取的关税政策合乎本国利益。We construct a bilateral trade model incorporating inside money and other two physical commodities, and then develop it into a tariff game when taking tariff retaliation into account. Using the real data of China and the Rest of the World （ROW） in 2005, we employ this model in numerical analysis to discuss the optimal tariff policies for China. The main finding of this paper is that, inside money really affects the Nash equilibrium for this tariff game. In the trade case that China and ROW present, inside money may increase the retaliating power of the country with trade deficit, and negatively affect the benefits of the country with trade surplus. We also find that China＇s tariff policy in 2005 is close to the optimal level, and ROW＇s is far from the corresponding optima. The practical implication of our finding is that, in order to improve the welfare of China, the tariffs on the imported primary products need to be lightly reduced.

关 键 词：关税税率 关税博弈 一般经济均衡 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：F822[经济管理—财政学] F752.5F224