完善公司治理确实能抑制大股东的控制私利吗  

Can Improvement in Corporate Governance Prevent Large Shareholders from Extracting Private Benefits?

作　　者：曹廷求[1,2] 王倩[2] 钱先航[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心 [2]山东大学经济学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2009年第1期18-26,63,共10页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532001);国家自然科学基金项目(70672098);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(07JJD630002) ;山东大学985项目"产业经济理论与政策研究"资助

摘　　要：本文采用流行的终极所有权方法对我国上市公司大股东控制私利进行了量化,并在此基础上采用2004和2005年1099家上市公司的样本数据检验了公司治理状况对于大股东控制私利的约束效果。我们的研究表明,公司治理整体上与大股东控制私利呈现倒U型的曲线关系,这种公司治理的总体效果是监事会治理和经理层治理两种治理机制对于大股东控制私利作用的叠加,除此之外的四种治理机制并没有起到约束大股东控制私利的显著作用。此外我们还发现,不同的公司特征也在不同程度上影响着大股东控制私利。Since the publication of the Berle-Means theorem, the viewpoint of dispersed ownership structure has been prevalent for nearly 50 years. During this period, the study of corporate governance has focused on agency costs caused by conflicts between shareholders and managers under the hypothesis of a dispersed ownership structure. However, since the 1980s, and especially after the excellent study of La Porta et al. （1999）, the viewpoint of a concentrated ownership structure has gradually gained popularity and brings austere challenges to the viewpoint of dispersed ownership structure. As a result, the focus of studies of corporate governance has changed to another kind of agency cost, which is caused by the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders under the hypothesis of concentrated ownership structure. Under the realistic assumption that China is typical country where the ownership structure is highly concentrated, studying the governance of large shareholders and the problems caused by large shareholders seems significant. This paper, using the popular method of ultimate ownership, calculates large shareholders＇ private benefits of control in Chinese listed companies. On this basis, using data from 1099 listed companies taken from 2004 and 2005, we examine the restricting effect of corporate governance on large shareholders＇ private benefits of control. We find that, the relationship between corporate governance and large shareholders＇ private benefit is an inverted U shape, and the overall effect of corporate governance consists of the combined influence of supervisory boards and management governance mechanisms. The other four governance mechanisms considered do not play a significant role in restricting large shareholders＇ private benefits of control. Furthermore, different firm characteristics also have an influence. Risk and the demand for funds have positive effects on large shareholders＇ private benefits. By contrast, state ownership restricts the extent of private

关 键 词：大股东控制私利 南开治理指数 终极所有权 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]