大股东、法律制度和资本结构决策--来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Large Shareholders,Legal Institutions and Capital Structure Decisions:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：肖作平[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院教授

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2009年第1期27-39,共13页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(200806131003)资助

摘　　要：本文结合中国制度,从理论角度推演大股东、法律制度如何影响资本结构决策,采用中国非金融上市公司截面数据,应用一系列OLS经验检验大股东、法律制度与资本结构决策之间关系。本研究提供的经验证据表明,大股东、法律制度确实影响资本结构决策。具体而言:(1)第一大股东持股比例与债务水平负相关;(2)最终控制人是国有企业的控制股东具有强烈的股权融资偏好,这类公司拥有相对低的债务水平;(3)少数大股东持股集中度与债务水平正相关;(4)第一大股东持股比例和少数大股东持股集中度的交互项与债务水平正相关,表明少数大股东持股集中度的提高能削减第一大股东和债务水平之间的负相关关系;(5)少数大股东持股集中度除以第一大股东持股比例、少数大股东持股集中度减去第一大股东持股比例与债务水平正相关,说明股权制衡能够抑制控制股东机会主义行为,股权制衡的公司具有相对高的债务水平;(6)法律制度对不同期限的债务水平具有不同影响,法律制度环境好的公司具有相对高的短期债务和相对低的长期债务,本文从中国的制度视角对这一现象进行解释;(7)第一大股东与债务水平之间的关系受法律制度环境的影响。This paper theoretically deduces how large shareholders and legal institutions affect capital structure decisions by integrating Chinese institutions. This paper uses cross-section data of nonfinancial listed companies in China and applies an OLS series to empirically test the relationship between large shareholders, legal institutions and capital structure decisions. The empirical evidence provided by this paper indicates that large shareholders and legal institutions do affect capital structure decisions. To be specific： （1） The proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with debt levels; （2） If the controlling shareholder is ultimately controlled by a state-owned enterprise, then there will be a preference for equity financing, and this kind of firm maintains relatively low debt levels; （3） The concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders is positively correlated with debt levels; （4） The interaction item between the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder and the concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders is positively correlated with debt levels, which indicates that increasing the concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders can weaken the negative relationship between the largest shareholder and debt levels; （5） The concentration degree of shares held by a few shareholders divided by the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder, and the concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders deducted by the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder are positively correlated with debt levels, which indicates that equity restriction can curb the opportunistic activity of controlling shareholders and firms with equity restrictions maintain relatively high debt levels; （6） Legal institutions have different effects on debt levels with different maturities, and firms under a sound legal institutional environment hold relatively high levels of short-te

关 键 词：大股东 最终控制人 法律制度 资本结构 经验证据 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]