独立董事报酬理论研究综述  

Theory of compensation of outside director:a literature review

作　　者：谌新民[1] 刘中虎[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第2期42-48,共7页Journal of Guangzhou University:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：从委托代理理论出发,提出独立董事的薪酬水平与薪酬结构的决定因素存在差异,对报酬制度、薪酬水平、薪酬结构、任期长短与独立董事独立性的关系,对独立董事与公司绩效关系,对独立董事的股权激励效果进行了系统的评述。Based on Principal-agent theory, this paper points out the different determinants for the compensation level and structure of outside directors. Systematic description has been given of the relationship between the independence of a outside director and the compensation system, level and structure, term of office, the relationship between an outside director and a company＇s performance, and the effects of stock incentive.

关 键 词：独立董事 薪酬 股权激励 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F01[经济管理—政治经济学]