政府控股、控制层级与代理问题的实证研究  

Government Control,Control Level and the Different of Agent Problem——The Empirical Evidence from State Holding Listed Companies

作　　者：何威风[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《中国软科学》2009年第2期107-114,共8页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(批准号:06BJY015)

摘　　要：本文依据国有控股公司"分级代理",将国有控股上市公司分为中央政府控股的上市公司和地方政府控股的上市公司。研究发现,两类上市公司的主要代理问题存在差异,中央政府控股的上市公司主要代理问题存在于控股股东和中小股东之间;地方政府控股的上市公司的主要代理问题存在于控股股东与经营者之间。这一研究结论的政策意义可以概括为:对于不同的国有控股上市公司应该采取不同的治理策略。Based on the grade control of state holding companies, state holding listed companies can be categorized as central government holding listed companies and local government holding listed companies. The empirical research in this paper finds that there are differences in agent problem for state holding listed companies in different grade of control： Central government holding listed companies mainly faced the agent problem between controlling shareholders and small- and- medium shareholders; whereas local government holding listed companies mainly face the agent problem between controlling shareholders and managers. The policy meaning of the result is that the difference measures are needed to improve the corporate governance of state holding listed companies.

关 键 词：国有控股公司 控制层级 代理问题 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]