基于信息不对称的中小企业贷款模式创新研究  

Study on Innovation of SME′s Loan Mode Based on Information Asymmetry

作　　者：郑君君[1] 赵贵玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《技术经济》2009年第3期32-37,共6页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(08JA630062)

摘　　要：通过对银企信息不对称情况下的贷款供需情况进行分析,指出由于软信息所反映的企业未来价值是隐性的,因此规模匹配只能在有限程度上解决中小企业贷款难的问题。本文认为:中小企业申请的贷款数额相对于其自身规模及债务清偿能力过大,是其难以从银行获得足够资金支持的原因;分散和转移银行提供超过中小企业债务清偿能力的贷款的风险才是解决中小企业贷款难的有效途径。据此,本文提出两种新型的银行贷款风险分散和转移模式——还贷保险模式和股权激励模式。This paper analyzes the supply and demand situation of bank loans for Chinese SMEs（small and medium-sized enterprises） under the condition of information asymmetry,and points out the scale-matching can solve the difficulty of SMEs in loan only to some extent because the future value of enterprises reflected by soft information is invisible. It holds that：the reason causing the difficulty of SMEs in obtaining sufficient loan from banks is that the amount of loans applied by SMEs is in excess of their own size and debt liquidity,and dispersing and transferring the risk from the banks providing loans for SMEs over their liquidity is an effective way to solve the difficulty of SMEs in loan. Hereby,it puts forward two new feasible modes of dispersing and transferring loan risk for banks-the repayment insurance mode and the stock equity motivation mode.

关 键 词：中小企业 信息不对称 规模匹配 还贷保险模式 股权激励模式 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]