治理环境、控制人性质与债务契约假说  

Governance Environment,Controller's Characteristic and Debt-covenant Hypothesis

作　　者：张玲[1] 刘启亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,厦门361005 [2]武汉大学经管学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《金融研究》2009年第2期102-115,共14页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：厦门大学陈汉文教授主持的国家社会科学基金课题"投资者保护;公司治理与我国证券市场资源配置效率研究"(项目批准号:07BJY027);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(项目号:NCET-04-0591)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文研究发现中国的治理环境、公司控制人性质对债务契约假说产生了不同于成熟市场经济的一些行为特征。以我国1999～2004年上市公司为样本,实证结果发现:公司的负债水平越高,盈余管理动机越强烈。由于政府控制公司的债务约束软化,负债水平对其盈余管理并无明显影响;而在非政府控制的样本组中,公司的负债水平则与盈余管理显著正相关。对非政府控制公司而言,治理环境因素显著影响负债水平与盈余管理之间的正相关关系。在市场化程度高、政府干预少、法治水平高的地区,这种正向关系更为强烈。The paper studies the governance environment and company controller＇s characteristic in China. The result shows that some company＇s behavior charactem differ from that of developed market economy. By using a sample of listed company in 1999 ～ 2004, the authors find the following results. （1） The higher debt level, the more incentives of earnings management; （2） Because debt constraints become soft to the government controlled company, debt level has no significant effect on earnings management. However, to the sub-sample of non-government controlled company, the debt level and EM show Significant positive relation. （3） For non-government controlled company, governance environment factors significantly affect the positive relation between debt level and EM. In the area where is of higher marketization, or lower government intervention, or higher legal level, their positive relation is stronger.

关 键 词：治理环境 控制人性质 债务契约假说 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]