敏捷供应链管理中最优激励方案的实现问题研究  

Optimal Incentive Policy in Profit Allocation of Agile Supply Chain Management

作　　者：綦方中[1,2] 胥琳[2] 马庆国[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310058 [2]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2009年第5期27-33,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y607166);浙江省教育厅科研项目(Z200702268)

摘　　要：合理的利益分配策略可以稳定敏捷供应链的运营过程,加速敏捷供应链目标的实现.基于委托-代理理论,研究了敏捷供应链利益分配中最优激励方案的设计问题,得出在信息对称条件下由于合作伙伴企业的努力水平可以为主导企业所观测,因而容易制定最优激励方案并实现利益分配.而在更多的信息不对称条件下,需要对合作伙伴企业的产出结果进行监督和评估,通过不同努力水平下的分布概率间接地获得努力水平信息.该结论对于敏捷供应链利益分配系统的设计与实现具有重要指导意义.对最优激励方案在敏捷供应链利益分配中的实现过程进行了说明,通过适当的评价指标体系和评价方法,实现了利益分配中考虑努力水平等因素的激励策略.Profit allocation is a sophisticated, sensitive and crucial issue in agile supply chain. Rational and equitable profit allocation policy plays an important role in the inter-relationship and the steady operation process of agile supply chain. Based on principal-agent principle, we investigate the optimal incentive policy design issues to various scenarios in agile supply chain profit allocation, including symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. Under the former condition, the optimal incentive policy is easy to implementation because the effort level could be observed by the dominant enterprise, while under the latter condition it need to monitor and evaluate the distributing probability of outcome under different effort levels. The conclusion is important to the design and implementation of profit allocation system in agile supply chain, and the implementation process of optimal incentive policy is illustrated by employing performance measurement index system and proper measurement algorithm.

关 键 词：敏捷供应链 利益分配 最优激励 委托-代理理论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]