中央银行紧急流动性支持信息披露问题研究  

Study on Information Disclosure of Central Bank's Emergency Liquidity Assistance

作　　者：陈元富[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行研究生部,北京100083

出　　处：《南方金融》2009年第3期23-25,58,共4页South China Finance

摘　　要：本文从理论和实证的双重视角对中央银行紧急流动性支持信息披露问题进行研究。结果表明,紧急流动性支持信息披露不服从货币政策透明优于神秘的单一规则,中央银行应当根据成本收益原则来选择信息披露方式。通常而言,对存款类金融机构提供紧急流动性支持时,阶段性保密优于及时披露;对非存款类金融机构提供紧急流动性支持时,及时披露优于阶段性保密。In this paper, we study information disclosure of central bank＇ s Emergency Liquidity Assistance （ELA） from both theoretic and practical prospects. The result shows that information disclosure of central bank＇ s ELA does not follow the same principle as information disclosure of monetary policy, in which transparency is always better than mystery. Central bank should select the model of information disclosure according to cost-profit rule. In general, for deposit-taking institutions to receive ELA, it is better to keep secret for a period than to disclose the secret immediately, while for those non-deposit-taking institutions, immediate disclosure is better.

关 键 词：中央银行 紧急流动性支持 信息披露 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F224