争当少数者博弈模型在非均衡条件下的演化研究  

Study on Evolution of Minority Game Model under Unequilibrium Condition

作　　者：杨伟松[1] 杨德军[2] 

机构地区：[1]江西科技师范学院通信与电子学院,江西南昌330013 [2]襄樊学院教育学院,湖北襄樊441053

出　　处：《襄樊学院学报》2009年第2期25-28,共4页Journal of Xiangfan University

摘　　要：研究了一种争当少数者博弈的演化模型.在YiLi等人提出的每一代中一定比例表现差的经纪人将自己的策略随机替换的演化模型基础上,进一步研究了该模型在引进不同截断值,即非均衡条件下的演化情况,发现非均衡条件下经纪人策略在策略空间中会出现另一类自组织有序分布现象.An evolution of minority game is studied. Yi Li et ai have proposed an evolution model that a certain proportion of poor agents in one generation may substitute their strategies randomly, the evolution case of the model under different cutoff or unequilibrium conditions is studied further in this paper, and another sell-organized order distribution phenomenon of agent strategies in strategy space is found.

关 键 词：争当少数者博弈 非均衡条件 博弈模型 

分 类 号：O414.2[理学—理论物理]