人才激励约束合同设计中的最优决策研究  

Incentive Constraint Contract Design for Optimizing Principal

作　　者：周丹[1] 陈绍刚[1] 熊小舟[2] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学应用数学学院,成都610054 [2]电子科技大学管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报》2007年第S1期476-479,共4页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金(79270052)

摘　　要：改进了传统人才激励约束合同设计中的主体风险中性的假定,提出了在主体风险规避假定下委托-代理合同的修改结果.通过将其他企业利润、经营者抵押权益等因素引入委托-代理合同,建立了有效的重复博弈长期激励机制.This paper improves traditional incentive constraint contract,in which assumed principal was always risk neutral,and gives an amended result of principal-agent contract on condition that principal is risk avoidable.At the same time,profit of other corporations and security interest are also introduced into principal-agent contract.In this way,an effective mechanism is established by recurring game and long-term incentive.

关 键 词：博弈 激励约束 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]