基于委托代理理论的绿色物流实施激励机制研究  

An Incentive Mechanism Study on Green Logistics Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：申建军[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南工业大学管理学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2009年第3期18-20,共3页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：现代物流活动的开展,对环境保护和资源利用存在诸多负面影响,政府应引导、激励企业实施绿色物流。论述了绿色物流的主要构成要素,研究了考虑风险态度的政府引导企业实施绿色物流的激励机制。通过建立风险规避和风险中性条件下的委托代理模型,分析了企业承担风险和补偿系数的影响因素。引入了基于其它契约变量的激励函数,提高了政府效用和企业实施绿色物流的努力程度。The development of the Modern Logistics has much negative effect on the environmental protection and resource utilization. Therefore, the government should induce and inspirit enterprises actualizing Green Logistics. This paper analyzes the primary inscape of the Green Logistics, and does a study on incentive mechanism by government of promoting enterprise to develop green logistics under different risk attitude. The paper builds up principal-agent model under the conditions of risk-averse and risk-neutral, discusses the factors which influence enterprise risk and compensation coefficient. The other contract variable and reputation are induced to incentive function, raises up effectiveness of government and endeavour level of enterprise.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 绿色物流 风险态度 激励机制 

分 类 号：F252.8[经济管理—国民经济]