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机构地区:[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052
出 处:《工业工程与管理》2009年第2期10-15,37,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(70502026)
摘 要:在由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链中,供应商允许零售商进行延期付款,研究了零售商所采取的单期订购决策及供应链协调问题。研究表明,允许零售商延期付款的斯塔克博格模型存在角点解均衡,供应商会占有所有供应链利润。分析得出了允许零售商延期付款的订购合同优于批发价格合同的条件以及供应链达到整体协调的条件。最后还研究了供应商提供零利率延期付款的合同,得出了供应商提供零利率延期付款的合同所实现的供应链利润优于允许零售商延期付款的斯塔克博格模型合同的条件。研究表明通过延期付款,供应商和零售商可以设计一个线性转移支付实现供应链效率的提升以及供应链协调。This paper studied retailer's one term purchasing decision policy and supply chain coordination problem by allowing trade credit in a supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The paper shows that there exists corner equilibrium in the Stackelberg game by allowing retailer's trade credit and supplier will dominate all supply chain profit. The paper gives the conditions that trade credit contract is better than the wholesale contract and supply chain was totally coordinated. Finally, the paper also studied a zero interest rate contract and gives the conditions that are better than the trade credit contract. Therefore, supplier and retailer can design a linear transfer mechanism to increase supply chain efficiency and realize supply chain coordination by trade credit term on the contract.
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