不对称信息下建设项目委托代理激励机制理论分析  

Analysis of incentive mechanisms for construction projects agent under asymmetric information

作　　者：项勇[1] 陶学明[1] 王永强[1] 

机构地区：[1]西华大学建筑与土木工程学院,四川成都610039

出　　处：《四川建筑科学研究》2009年第2期276-278,共3页Sichuan Building Science

摘　　要：在工程项目管理中,工程咨询公司接受业主委托进行工程项目管理,从授权开始至委托合同结束,双方均存在信息不对称的局面。基于委托代理理论基本模型,对项目管理中信息不对称下的绝对绩效、差别绩效、差别与绝对绩效相结合的3种激励机制进行分析,并说明了各种激励机制在项目管理中的作用。In project management,the engineering consuhancies are commissioned by the owner to manage the project, from authorized start to the end of the commissioning contract, both sides have the situation of information asymmetry. Based on the basic model of the principal-agent theory, this article analysis three incentive mechanisms including the absolute performance, the different performance and the combination of the two formers under the asymmetric information, and illuminates the function of the various incentive mechanisms in the project management.

关 键 词：不对称信息 建设项目 委托代理 激励机制 

分 类 号：TU71[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]