基于动态合作博弈理论的航空联盟稳定性  

Airline alliance stability based on dynamic cooperative game theory

作　　者：郑士源[1] 王浣尘[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海200135 [2]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2009年第4期184-192,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70450001);上海市高等学校科学技术发展基金(06FS045;06FZ011)

摘　　要：利用动态合作博弈方法对航空企业的竞争和联盟进行研究,分析了各种联盟结构中的最大一致集,并运用联盟形成均衡过程找出其中最稳定的结果.通过比较可以看出:对航空企业总体而言,纵向联盟优于横向联盟.当不同航空企业的服务替代性较小和较大的时候,各航空企业偏好不联盟;当服务替代性处于中等水平时,纵向联盟最稳定.当各航空企业不联盟时,社会福利水平最高.The competition and alliance among airlines were studied based on the theory of dynamic cooperative game. The most stable result was found by means of Equilibrium Process of Coalition Formation （EPCF） in the Largest Consistent Set （LCS）. The following conclusions were made with comparisons. Vertical alliance was better than horizontal alliance to the whole airlines. When the substitute between the airlines was small and large, without alliance was the most stable result. When the substitute between the airlines was middle, vertical alliance was the most stable one. The social welfare level was highest without alliance formed.

关 键 词：航空联盟 稳定性 动态合作博弈 最大一致集 联盟形成均衡过程 

分 类 号：TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程] F426.5[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程]