不对称信息下供应链线性分成制契约设计研究  

Design of supply chain linear shared-saving contract with asymmetric information

作　　者：曹柬[1,2] 杨春节[1] 李平[1] 周根贵[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学工业控制技术研究所,杭州310027 [2]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,杭州310032

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2009年第2期19-30,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70671095,60674086);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(07JD630003);浙江省软科学研究资助项目(2008C25040);浙江省教育厅科研资助项目(20060835)

摘　　要：成员间收益的合理分配是供应链高效协调运作的关键因素之一.针对一个道德风险和逆向选择问题并存的二级供应链系统,结合stackelberg博弈模型和激励机制理论,分别研究了不对称信息为离散类型和连续类型情况下的线性分成制契约设计过程.比较了线性分离契约和线性混同契约的有效性,分析了各种相关因素对契约的影响,提出了不对称信息为连续类型情况下的次优契约是线性分离契约的前提条件,并通过数值仿真讨论了各种参数变化对委托方期望收益的影响.所得结论对供应链的运营实践有着很好的参考价值和指导意义.To improve supply chain performance, one key step is to share the profit efficiently between mem- bers. for a bi-level supply chain system with both moral hazard and adverse selection, the design of linear shared-saving contracts was studied when asymmetric information was discrete and continuous respectively. The contract was modeled to be an optimal programming problem and solved by stackelberg game model and the theory, of incentive mechanism. The validity of the linear screening contract was illustrated by comparing it with the linear pooling contract, and the influence of several correlative factors on the linear contract was ana- lyzed in detail as well. The premise of a second-best contract being a linear screening under consecutive asym- metric information was proposed. The effects of certain parameters on the principal＇ s expected profit were also inllustrated with a numerical simulation. The conclusion in the paper is valuable and significant to the operation of supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 线性分成制契约 道德风险 逆向选择 激励机制 STACKELBERG模型 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]