负债、资源控制与大股东剥削  

Debt,Resources Control and Large Shareholders Expropriation

作　　者：江伟[1] 沈艺峰[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学会计系 [2]厦门大学管理学院财务研究与发展中心

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2008年第5期96-110,共15页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70372033)和(70702040);教育部人文社科基金项目(08JC630073);暨南大学人文社会科学发展基金项目(006JSYJ041)的资助

摘　　要：本文考察了控制我国上市公司的大股东对公司资本结构的选择。研究结果表明:在负债没有发挥控制作用的情况下,控制上市公司的大股东出于剥削的动机,会利用上市公司下属的子公司进行更多的负债融资,从而控制更多的公司资源,对外部投资者进行更多的剥削;而且大股东的持股比例、审计质量和公司类别都会对大股东利用上市公司下属的子公司进行更多负债融资的行为产生影响。This paper examines capital structure decisions of Chinese listed companies which are controlled by large shareholders. The empirical results show that：while the control effect of debt in Chinese listed companies does not work ,under the motivation of expropriation, large shareholders will carry out more debt financing through the subsidiaries affiliated to listed companies. The more debt financing,the more resources large shareholders can control,the more expropriation large shareholders can do on external investors. What＇s more,the shares held by large shareholders,auditing quality and firms＇nature all can have effect on the capital structure decisions taken by large shareholders through the subsidiaries affiliated.

关 键 词：大股东 剥削 负债融资 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]