Bertrand双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Bertrand Duopoly's Behavior to Their Upstream Suppliers

作　　者：韩敬稳[1,2] 赵道致[1] 秦娟娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 [2]天津财经大学理工学院,天津300222

出　　处：《管理科学》2009年第2期57-63,共7页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70771073)~~

摘　　要：针对目前普遍存在的供应链上下游由于力量不对等而导致的强势一方向弱势一方转嫁成本的现状,研究力量不对等供应链上零售寡头对上游供应商的行为策略。建立竞争环境下的Bertrand寡头模型,得到双寡头采用不同行为策略的支付矩阵。在此基础上,应用演化博弈论中双种群演化模型进行分析,得到双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化稳定均衡。研究结果表明,由于零售寡头之间的竞争,随着寡头对供应商利益侵占数额的增大,双寡头对上游供应商的均衡策略依次为(转嫁成本,转嫁成本)、(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)以及(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)与(不转嫁成本,转嫁成本)共存的情况。同时进一步指出市场容量、寡头实力差距、侵占度等参数变化对演化稳定均衡的影响。Targeting at the ubiquity of transferring cost from powerful member to weak one for their unbalanced bargaining power, we study the behavior of the retailer duopoly to their upstream supplier on supply chain with unbalanced bargaining power. We construct a Bertrand duopoly model with competition so as to obtain a payoff matrix of different behavior strategies. On this basis, using double groups＇ evolutionary model in evolutionary game theory we get the evolutionary stable strategies （ESS） of the duopoly＇s behavior under different conditions. We show that for the competition between retailer duopoly, with increasing the amount of embezzlement, the evolutionary stable strategies are respectively （ transferring cost, transferring cost ）, （ transferring cost, not transferring cost） and （transferring cost, not transferring cost） coexisting with （not transferring cost, transferring cost）. The affections of the factors such as market capacity, strength gap of duopoly and the degree of cmbezzlemenl to the ESS have also been analyzed.

关 键 词：力量不对等供应链 Bertrand寡头模型 双种群演化模型 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F713.54[经济管理—市场营销]