重复合作联合体工程总承包商利益分配机制  

Study on Division of Profit with in Repeated Alliance General Contractor

作　　者：管百海[1] 胡培[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2009年第2期172-176,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20060613019)

摘　　要：以合约理论为基础,建立重复合作联合体工程总承包商的博弈模型。在考虑收益的时间价值,即折现率情况下,以"针锋相对"、"冷酷"触发策略为例,分别讨论了联合体中设计单位和施工企业的策略选择。结果表明,项目优化设计收益分配给某成员的比例越高,其违反事先约定的可能性越小;反之,违约的可能性越大。联合体成员在"针锋相对"触发策略下比在"冷酷"触发策略下更易违反事先约定。The paper establishes competing model of repeated alliance general contractor basing on contract theory. It discusses the strategy choice of designing company and building company within the alliance general contractor under consideration of the time-value（that is discount rate） of the profit. It indicates that the probability of the member＇s breaching of faith will be smaller if the proportion of it＇s gaining profit is greater. Contrarily, it will be greater. And the member of the alliance general contractor will be more likely to breach of faith under the condition of tit-for-tat than under the condition of trigger strategy.

关 键 词：重复合作 针锋相对 冷酷触发 折现率 

分 类 号：F062.4[经济管理—政治经济学]