排污权私人价值拍卖机制中风险规避型竞拍者的出价策略  

Risk Averse Buyers' Bidding Price in Emission Permits Auction based on SIPV Model

作　　者：顾孟迪[1] 李寿德[1] 汪帆[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2009年第2期203-205,225,共4页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573073)

摘　　要：分析了排污权私人价值拍卖机制中参与拍卖的费用、佣金比率和绝对风险规避度等对风险规避型竞拍者出价策略的影响问题。研究表明,参与拍卖的费用与出价同向变动,佣金比率与出价反向变动,在第1价格拍卖中,绝对风险规避度与出价反向变动,在第2价格拍卖中与出价同向变动。Based on the SIPV model, this paper analyzes the effects of auction fee, commission rate and Absolute Risk Aversion on the buyers＇ biding price of emission permits. We find that biding price increases as auction fee increases. The bigger the commission rate is, the lower the price becomes. In the firstprice auction, biding price increases with ARA＇s decreasing. But in the second-price auction, it is the opposite.

关 键 词：排污权 私人价值拍卖 风险规避 期望效用 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]