论皮尔斯的现象学范畴  

Peirce's Phenomenological Categories

作　　者：邱忠善[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学外国哲学研究所,北京100871

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2009年第2期51-56,共6页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部2007年度人文社会科学规划基金项目"本体论批判"(07JA720017)

摘　　要：受康德影响,皮尔斯极为重视范畴演绎,他试图找到比康德范畴更普遍的基本范畴。1902年以后,范畴演绎进入现象学时期,基本范畴最终确定为第一性、第二性和第三性。范畴演绎是皮尔斯哲学的基石,是皮尔斯建构体系最重要的方法和工具。Being deeply influenced by Kant, Charles S. Peirce attached much importance to deduction of categories. He attempted to find a list of basic categories more general than that of Kant＇ s. After 1902, he succeeded to develop the phenomenological method for categorical deduction from which the three most general categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness were derived. Category deduction was regarded by Perice himself as a cornerstone of his philosophy and was the most important tool he used to construct and develop his system.

关 键 词：皮尔斯 范畴 现象学 第一性 第二性 第三性 

分 类 号：B712.43[哲学宗教—外国哲学]