基于委托代理机制的研发外包边界  

The Border Issue on R&D Outsourcing Based on Principal-agent

作　　者：朱新财[1] 银路[1] 肖凡平[2] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054 [2]西南民族大学管理学院,四川成都610041

出　　处：《系统工程》2009年第3期99-103,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772069)

摘　　要：由于技术的复杂性与不确定性,研发外包近年来受到越来越多公司的青睐。但是信息泄露问题使得研发外包受到了一定的影响。鉴于此,本文利用委托代理机制建立了一个过程创新的研发外包选择模型,并用博弈论分析了无信息泄漏情况下外包与内部研发的边界,信息泄漏情况下外包与内部研发的边界及信息泄漏情况下外包与无信息泄漏情况下外包的边界。文章结论对于研发外包决策有重要参考价值。In recent years, due to technical complexity and uncertainty of research and development, R＆D Outsourcing has been favored by more and more companies. However, to a certain extent, the outsourcing of researeh and development was influenced by the information disclosure. In view of this, this paper constructs a selective model of research and development outsourcing with an innovative process through agency mechanism, and use game theory to analyze the border of the outsourcing and internal research and development without information disclosure, the border of the outsourcing of information leakage and internal research and development, and the border of the outsourcing of information leakage and no leakage of information. It offers valuable reference for the decisions of the research and development outsoureing.

关 键 词：研发外包 委托-代理 信息泄露 边界 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]