意识机的哲学基础质疑  

A Challenge to the Philosophical Foundation of Conscious Machines

作　　者：李绍猛[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2009年第3期52-57,共6页Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：很多人都相信,我们最终肯定可以制造出有意识的机器。本文试图挖掘这种信念的哲学基础,并探讨这个哲学基础的可靠性。本文发现,这种信念的现有哲学基础,即所谓的"第三人称原则"并不成立。通过一个名为"意识分享"的思想实验,本文用归谬法否定了第三人称原则:第三人称原则意味着意识分享是可能的,但事实上意识分享不可能实现。因此,第三人称原则不能成立,更不能被用来证明我们最终能造出意识机。Many scholars believe that we will ultimately be able to make conscious machines. This article inquires, and checks the reliability of, the philosophical foundation of this belief. I will reveal that the current philosophical foundation of this belief, the so-called ＂Third Person Principle＂, does not hold. Through a thought experiment named ＂Consciousness Sharing＂, this article refutes ＂Third Person Principle＂ in a reduction to absurdity argument, that is, ＂Third Person Principle＂ implies that consciousness sharing must be possible. Yet in fact it is not possible at all. ＂Third Person Principle＂ therefore does not hold. Nor could it be the philosophical foundation of the belief of the possibility of conscious machines.

关 键 词：意识机 意识分享 第三人称原则 还原论的唯物主义 

分 类 号：B022[哲学宗教—哲学理论]