第三方在线支付市场的企业进/退博弈模型与算法  

Enterprises Enter/Exit Game Model and Algorithm for Third-party Online Payment Market

作　　者：帅青红[1] 周启海[1,2] 师群昌[1] 喻敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学信息技术应用研究所,成都610074 [2]西南财经大学经济信息工程学院,成都610074

出　　处：《计算机科学》2009年第6期254-257,共4页Computer Science

摘　　要：分析了第三方支付研究现状,提出了第三方在线支付企业市场进退问题;针对第三方在线支付企业市场进退的时机、机制、策略选择等,构建了基于博弈论的逆向剪枝模型与算法,并就企业市场进退战略提出了相应对策:1)对于市场占有率极低且其提供的产品服务同质性很高的较小在线第三方支付企业,应尽早退出在线支付市场或将营业中心进行转移;2)对尚无第三方在线支付强劲实力的未到位新企业,尤应力戒盲目进入。This paper analyzed the third-party payment research current research status,pointed out the problem about enterprises to enter or exit third-party online payment market. To point against the opporunity,mechanism, tactics and so on of enterprises enter/exit the third-party payment market, the reverse pruning model and algorithm based on game theory was constructed, and some countermeasures for the third-party payment enterprises were given： 1） If the smaller enterprises are occupant only very low market share and their products ＆ services are high homogeneity, they should exit earlier; 2） If the new enterprises without power busyness force of the third-party payment, they should avoid entry blindly.

关 键 词：第三方在线支付 博弈树 逆向剪枝法 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]