委托代理条件下规避风险投资家道德风险的激励机制探析  

An Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism for Evading Risk Investors'Moral Hazard Under the Condition of Principal-Agency

作　　者：李建[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072 [2]河南财经学院国际经济与贸易学院,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《经济经纬》2009年第3期129-132,共4页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号40671048)

摘　　要：委托代理条件下规避风险投资家道德风险一直是学界研究的热点和难点问题之一。由于风险投资家和风险资本家之间的信息不对称,特别是风险投资家难以察觉的私人信息使风险投资契约达成后风险资本家面临道德风险。本文以激励理论为指导,从中国风险投资实践的客观现实出发,初步探析了一个有关规避风险投资家道德风险的激励机制,作为风险投资契约不完备性的补充与完善。Evading risk investors＇ moral hazard under the condition of principal-agency has always been one of the hot and hard issues in the academic circle. The asymmetric information between the risk investors and the risk capitalists, especially the private information which is hard to be observed by risk investors, makes risk capitalists face moral hazard after the risk investment contract is signed. Guided by the incentive theory, starting from the reality of risk investment in China, the author explores an incentive mechanism for evading risk investors＇ moral hazard as the supplement and perfection of risk investment contracts.

关 键 词：风险投资 道德风险 激励机制 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]