非公平关联交易、信息披露与终极股东隧道效应  

Unfair Related Transactions, Information Disclosure and Ultimate Shareholder’s Tunnel Effect

作　　者：刘武[1] 郭红卫[1] 王竹园[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《南方金融》2009年第5期46-49,共4页South China Finance

摘　　要：我国上市公司终极股东普遍采取违规信息披露与非公平关联交易的方式侵占中小股东利益,从而产生了终极股东的隧道效应。本文通过Logistic回归方法,分析了能够抑制终极股东隧道行为的主要因素,为推进股权分置改革进一步深化,改善上市公司治理,保护中小股东权益的政策提供了实证依据。The ultimate shareholders of the listed company in China generally invades interests of minority shareholders by violation of information disclosure and unfair related transactions, and thus the problem of the ultimate shareholder＇s tunnel effect emerges. This paper studies the main factors to suppress the ultimate shareholder tunnel behavior by the logistic regression method. It also provides empirical evidence for deepening the advancement of the equity division reform, the improvement the corporate governance efficiency of the listed companies and equity protection policy for the minority shareholders.

关 键 词：控股股东 非公平关联交易 信息披露 隧道效应 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]