国有资产的监管与委托-代理、激励-约束分析  

To Analyze on Trusting-Agency and Encouraging-Restraining with Supervising of State-Owned Assets

作　　者：刘志永[1] 田鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东经济学院财政金融学院,济南250014

出　　处：《价值工程》2009年第6期136-138,共3页Value Engineering

摘　　要：所有权与经营权分离,是现代企业的一个重要特征,国有企业也不例外。在所有者与经营者分离的情况下,由于信息不对称、契约不完全以及双方利益的不一致性,使得委托-代理问题难以避免。国有企业的特殊性,使得委托-代理问题更加复杂化。Low efficiency of state-owned enterprises have great relations with the special trusting-agencyau. Separation of the property rights and the operating fight is the modern enterprise＇s characteristic,so as state-owned enterprises. For the separation of the property rights and the operating right,the information is not symmetric,the contract is incompletely,the benefit of both sides （principal and agent） is not coincident,those make it difficult to avoid the trusting-agencyau problems. The trusting-agencyau problems of state-owned enterprise are even more complicated because of its special property rights relationships. The article has established a game model and analyzed the process of game between clients and agents,put forward some measures to perfect the supervision and management of state-owned assets.

关 键 词：国有资产监管 委托-代理 博弈 激励-约束 

分 类 号：F273.4[经济管理—企业管理]