创业资本产权结构的制度安排  

The Institution Arrangement on the Property Rights of Venture Capital

作　　者：尹国俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学财经学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2009年第5期52-58,共7页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目(04CJL018);浙江省软科学项目(2007C25024)

摘　　要：产权制度安排对创业资本的运作效率几乎产生决定性的影响。在高度的信息不对称和双层委托代理关系条件下,创业资本产权制度安排是建立在对创业投资家和创业企业家人力资本高度依赖基础之上的。创业资本产权的合理配置应该是赋予创业资本组织相对独立而充分的产权、构建激励与约束相容的创业资本组织形式,并在创业投资家和创业资本出资者之间分享剩余索取权,同时将控制权在创业投资家与创业企业家之间设计成随"状态"而变化的一种"状态依存权"。The property rights institution arrangement has the nearly decisive influence to the efficiency of venture capital. Under the con- dition of serious not symmetry information and double trust - agent, the property rights institution arrangement of venture capital is estab- lished above the foundation of highly confidence to the human capital of venture capitalist and venture enterpriser. The reasonable disposi- tion of the property rights of venture capital is to give venture capital organization with full property rights which is relatively independent, to construct the venture capital organization accommodating the encouragement and the restraint, and to share the right for claim to surplus between the venture capitalist and venture investor. Meanwhile, we should design the domination right as the state - contingent control right changing along with the condition between the venture capitalist and venture enterpriser.

关 键 词：创业资本 产权结构 制度安排 状态依存权 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]