终极控制、自由现金流约束与公司绩效--基于我国民营上市公司的经验证据  

Ultimate Control,Free Cash Flow Constraint and Corporate Performance——Evidence Based on Chinese Private-controlled Listed Companies

作　　者：杨淑娥[1,2] 苏坤[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,710049 [2]上海对外贸易学院金融学院,201620

出　　处：《会计研究》2009年第4期78-86,共9页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70672054)“基于终极所有权结构差异的代理问题与融资决策研究”;上海市教委重点学科建设项目(J512-01)资助

摘　　要：本文从终极控制人的视角,以我国2002-2006年民营上市公司为研究对象,研究了终极控制股东现金流权及控制权与现金流权的偏离对公司绩效的影响,并在此基础上考察了自由现金流对终极控制股东攫取行为的约束作用。研究表明:现金流权与公司绩效显著正相关,对终极控制股东存在"激励效应";控制权与现金流权的偏离与公司绩效显著负相关,终极控制股东对公司具有"堑壕效应",且当现金流权较高时,终极控制股东的"堑壕效应"显著降低。进一步研究发现,终极控制股东攫取行为的发生不仅需要其有"能力"和"动机",还需要有充足的自由现金流这个"机会",较少的自由现金流能够有效地约束终极控制股东的攫取行为。By analyzing Chinese private-controlled listed companies over the period of 2002-2006,this paper investigates how the cash flow right of the ultimate controlling shareholder and the deviation of the controlling right and cash flow right influence corporate performance.This paper further studies the constraint effect of the free cash flow on ultimate controlling shareholder's expropriation.The results show that cash flow right is positively correlated with corporate performance and has an 'incentive effect'to ultimate controlling shareholder;the deviation of controlling right and cash flow right is negatively correlated with corporate performance,and the ultimate controlling shareholder has an 'entrenchment effect'.If the ultimate controlling shareholder has a relatively high cash flow right,its 'entrenchment effect'is reduced significantly.The result of further study shows that the occurrence of the ultimate controlling shareholder's expropriation not only needs 'ability' and 'motivation',but also needs 'opportunity' with sufficient free cash flow.The free cash flow can constrain the ultimate controlling shareholder's expropriation efficiently.

关 键 词：终极控制 自由现金流 公司绩效 PP冲突 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]