蒋介石与1935年中日苏关系的转折  

Chiang Kai-shek and the Turn in Sino-Japanese and Sino-Soviet Relations in 1935

作　　者：鹿锡俊[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]日本大东文化大学 [2]南京大学中华民国史研究中心

出　　处：《近代史研究》2009年第3期4-27,共24页Modern Chinese History Studies

摘　　要：1935年初国民政府的对日对苏政策具有多重性质。对处于复杂的互动作用中的中日苏三角关系及蒋介石的战略作出片面的理解,是日本发动华北事变的重大原因。蒋介石在对事变的因应中曾从正反两个方面运用苏联因素,并尝试以"共同防苏"换取日本对华政策的改善。但日本对之提出了中方难以接受的前提,最终迫使蒋介石及国民政府在大政方针上转向对苏不惜联合与对日不惧应战。导致这一转折的决定性的外因,是日苏两国在中国的主权问题与政权问题上的不同姿态。In early 1935,the Nationalist government’s policies toward Japan and the Soviet Union had many aspects. Japan’sone-sided understanding of Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy and of the complex triangular interactions between China,Japan andthe Soviet Union was an important reason why Japan instigated the North China Incident. In response to the incident,Chiang Kai-shek used the Soviet factor both positively and negatively,and tried to use'commonly defending against the So-viet Union'as a bargaining chip to get Japan to improve its China policy. However,Japan put forward preconditions thatChina could not accept,and finally Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were forced to make a major policychange,no longer hesitating to unite with the Soviet Union and no longer being afraid to meet Japan’s attack.The decisiveexternal causes leading to this turn were the different stances of Japan and the Soviet Union on China’s sovereignty and po-litical power.

关 键 词：蒋介石 中日苏关系 华北事变 防苏 联苏 抗日 

分 类 号：K263[历史地理—历史学]