贷款证券化、道德风险与监管缺失  

Loan Securitization,Lack of Regulation and Moral Hazard

作　　者：张桥云[1] 韩煦[1] 陈跃军[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学金融学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2009年第7期10-17,共8页Finance & Economics

基　　金：2008年国家社科基金"完善我国住房金融制度研究"(项目批准号: 08BJY051);2009年社科基金项目"次贷危机与资产证券化监管制度健全问题研究";教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：美国自20世纪70年代开始发展抵押贷款证券化业务以来,在住房抵押贷款市场上很好地解决了放款机构资金来源约束和流动性约束问题,保证了放款机构的资本充足率,转移了信用风险,扩大了贷款规模,推动了整个社会GDP的增长。然而,次级贷款危机的爆发使证券化所存在的风险和对金融体系稳定的影响成为一个备受关注的课题。我国贷款证券化业务尚处于起步阶段,研究美国较为成熟的抵押贷款证券化运作中的经验与教训,对完善我国证券化改革具有重要的理论和实践意义。In 2007, America broke out the subprime mortgage crisis, resulting in several financial institutions going bankrupt, and the stock market crashing, which affect American and global financial market. In this paper, we focus on how mortgage loan securitization change the performance of relevant participants, especially lenders, securitization and its mechanism of risk diffusion and risk amplification, as well as how securitization lowers the effectiveness of capital requirement regulation. Through this study, we found securitization resulting in the difference between loan balance on banks＇ balance sheet and true loan amount in the whole society, meanwhile securifization leading to the capital sufficient in banks but insufficient in society. Loan securitization with risk transfer function can also diffuse and amplify the risk, as well as cause moral hazard, which may exacerbate the aggregation and hazard of risks in the absence of regulation.

关 键 词：证券化 道德风险 监管缺失 次贷危机 

分 类 号：B82-053[哲学宗教—伦理学] F830.91[经济管理—金融学]