随机需求下的两级供应链主从对策模型研究  

Research on Stackelberg Game Model in a Two-echelon Supply Chain under Stochastic Demand

作　　者：蔡建湖[1] 周根贵[1] 黄卫来[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,杭州310023 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报》2009年第13期157-160,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70671095);浙江省社会科学界联合会研究课题(07B03)

摘　　要：讨论一个两级供应链环境下的报童模型,供应商通过确定批发价而在与零售商的竞争中处于领导者地位,用逆向归纳法分析该博弈模型,并求得了均衡解。进一步讨论回收契约对供应链竞争结构的影响,寻找优化供应链性能的途径。最后用一个算例对结论进行了说明。We construct an extended newsvendor model in a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, and the supplier acts as a Stackelberg leader by setting the wholesale price. The equilibrium solutions are gained by using backward induction. A buy hack contract is put forward to optimize the performance of the supply chain. The influence of buy hack contract on competition structure of the supply chain is discussed, and supply chain members＇ optimal decisions are gained. Our findings are illustrated by a numerical example.

关 键 词：供应链 回收契约 博弈 协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]