董事会治理特征:上市公司信息披露违规的经验证据  

Board Governance:Experiential Evidence from Information Disclosure Fraud of Listed Companies

作　　者：张晓岚[1] 吴东霖[2] 张超[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外贸易学院会计学院,上海201620 [2]中国人民银行西安分行,陕西西安710075

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2009年第4期99-107,共9页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:70572041);上海市教育委员会重点学科(第五期)资助项目(批准号:J51202)

摘　　要：作为公司治理核心的董事会具有信息披露监督的权利与义务,董事会治理水平直接关系到信息披露违规与否,深入研究二者的关系和互动机制,有助于探索提高公司治理有效性和会计信息披露质量的共性措施。本文在研究董事会治理特征的整体框架的基础上,以会计信息披露违规作为终极研究对象,选择2004-2006年间受证监会及证券交易所处罚的上市公司为样本,实证检验了董事会治理与会计信息披露违规的内在关系,为改善董事会治理水平、抑制信息披露违规提供经验证据。The board has the right and obligation of information disclosure. Board governance is directly related to information disclosure fraud. It is helpful for effective governance and accounting disclosure to research the relationships between these two aspects. This paper empirically tests the relationships between board governance and fraud in accounting information disclosure with sample from listed companies punished by CSRC and CSE through 2003-2006. Our research may provide reference for board governance improvement and disclosure fraud prevention.

关 键 词：信息披露 违规 董事会治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]