企业内部决策权有效配置动态循环模型——一个行为视角的分析  

Study of Dynamic Modeling on the Effective Decision Right Allocation within Firms:Analysis Based on Behavioral Perspective

作　　者：施丽芳[1] 廖飞[1] 茅宁[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《经济管理》2009年第7期134-140,共7页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：授权中存在两个难题:信息成本与代理成本之间的权衡、管理干预引致的授权不可信。对这两个难题的研究占据了决策权配置研究的核心位置。学者们对每一个难题都做了相关的探讨,但对两个难题之间的内在联系以及它们对决策权配置作用机制的关注还很不够。信息成本与代理成本之间的权衡与管理干预均是复杂的管理行为,本文从行为视角出发,研究了信息成本和代理成本之间的权衡、管理干预、企业内部决策权配置之间的相互影响。在考虑了时间因素之后,构建了一个企业内部决策权配置的动态循环模型。本研究有助于推进决策权配置领域的研究,对行为组织经济学的发展有所贡献,并为企业决策权配置实践提供更具可行性的理论建议。There are two key problems existed in delegation of decision right within firms： trade-offs between information costs and agency costs, delegation not credible caused by managerial intervention. The two problems hold a most important position in research on decision right allocation. A huge organizational behavior literature discussed every single problem, but there＇s not enough focus on the inherent relationship between the two problems and their influencing mechanism to decision right allocation. Both trade-offs between information costs and agency costs, managerial intervention are complex managerial behavior. Based on Behavioral decision making theory, this paper studied the interactional influencing relationship existed among trade-offs between information costs and agency costs, managerial intervention, decision right allocation. After considering the timing factor, set up a dynamic model of effective decision right allocation within firms.

关 键 词：信息成本 代理成本 管理干预 决策权配置 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]